

Town Meeting



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What Are the Answers from Korea?

Moderators, WILLIAM TRAUM, GUNNAR BACK

S p e a k e r s

LINDESAY PARROTT HENRY HAYWARD ROBERT PROSSER
WALTER SIMMONS ROBERT EUNSON



COMING

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THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

HENRY HAYWARD—Chief of the *Christian Science Monitor's* Far Eastern Staff. Henry Hayward's area of operation ranges from Tokyo and Korea to Singapore, his attention focused primarily on Korea where he has been filing stories on the war as well as the South Korean political scene. Prior to his appointment to the Tokyo post, he was assistant foreign editor. He has traveled extensively through Asia and Europe and formerly was the *Monitor's* United Nations correspondent.

ROBERT EUNSON—Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Japan and Korea. Robert Eunson asked for a war reporting assignment with the AP because he wanted more action. He has seen plenty in the last ten years in both the Pacific and European war theaters. Mr. Eunson went to Korea in November, 1950, and was named Chief of the AP Bureau for Japan and Korea in May, 1951. For about a year he was on the New York bureau staff. During World War II in Europe he covered the United States, Canadian and British forces. In the post-war setup he was second in command until he returned to this country in 1949.

LINDESAY PARROTT—Chief of the Tokyo Bureau, *The New York Times*. While covering the Philippines invasion as *Times* war correspondent in 1944, Parrott was hurt on Leyte by a Japanese fragmentation bomb and was hospitalized until the following spring. He came out of the painful experience to sufficiently good effect to take charge of the *Times* Tokyo Bureau upon its reopening after the surrender to General MacArthur aboard the U.S.S. Missouri ("Old Mo") in 1945. Parrott has been with the *Times* since 1937. He has had a varied newspaper experience here and abroad and speaks English, French, Russian, Italian and "some Japanese."

WALTER SIMMONS—Chief of the Chicago *Tribune* Tokyo Bureau. With the exception of a few weeks vacation in Chicago, Walter A. Simmons

(Continued on page 14)

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What Are the Answers from Korea?

Announcer:

Tonight your Town Meeting originates in Tokyo and New York. You will hear a group of distinguished war correspondents in a discussion of questions which have been submitted by Town Meeting listeners during the past several weeks—questions about the Korean War. Our moderator, Gunnar Back, will tell you more about this special program in just a moment. Since its very beginning in May, 1935, almost 18 years ago, Town Meeting has brought you a total of 743 discussions of the great questions of our time. It is the objective of Town Meeting to bring you all sides of subjects which we feel are of personal interest to you in order that you may weigh all the facts and then make up your own mind.

This is the philosophy of Town Hall of New York which produces these programs every Tuesday night. We will be glad to send you a new booklet which tells the story of all Town Hall activities. Just write Town Hall, New York 36, New York. Now to preside as moderator for tonight's discussion, here is ABC's well-known Washington news reporter, Gunnar Back.

Moderator Back:

Good evening, friends. Those of us of Town Hall and the ABC Radio Network associated with America's Town Meeting consider this particular broadcast one of the most important since Town Meeting's beginning in 1935. Our subject is: "What are the answers from Korea?" We know of no other group more highly qualified for a free and open discussion of this situation than the seasoned war correspondents who have spent

long days and hours on the spot in Korea. So tonight on this Town Meeting, we bring you from Tokyo an uncensored discussion of Korea by men who just a short while ago were with the United Nations forces on the front lines.

During the past few weeks we asked you to send us the questions you wanted to have answered about Korea; so, in effect, our questions do not come from our audience attending the broadcast, but from cities and towns all over America, through the affiliated stations of the ABC Radio Network. In the Tokyo studio, our moderator is Mr. William R. Traum and he will now tell you about our speakers there.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Gunnar Back, and good evening, friends, from Tokyo. Before we begin this trans-Pacific discussion, it is an honor to welcome to America's Town Meeting the Commander-in-Chief of our nation's Far East forces, General Mark Clark.

General Clark: I am indeed happy to send this word of greeting to the American people on this significant broadcast of America's Town Meeting. I should like to pay my highest compliment to the Town Hall of New York and the American Broadcasting Company for presenting this program, with the purpose of helping to clarify the problems of Korea. In a moment you will hear a panel of war correspondents discuss questions which have come from those of you in the radio audience. I know these reporters will answer your questions with the same honesty, frankness, and integrity which distinguishes the writings of their dispatches on the battle front.

Side by side with our fighting

men, the war correspondent makes it possible for you to read in your newspapers and news magazines, hear on your radio, and see on your television set the progress of the war, the bravery of your sons, husbands, brothers and loved ones. I am confident that this panel discussion will reward you with a fuller understanding of what this struggle in Korea means to each of us in the free world which we are determined so resolutely to preserve.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, General Clark. With us here in the Tokyo studios are five distinguished American correspondents ready to discuss the questions which you, our listeners, have submitted during the past few weeks. Our speakers tonight are: Lindesay Parrott, Chief of the Tokyo Bureau of the *New York Times*, who was assigned to Tokyo seven years ago; Henry Hayward, Chief Far Eastern correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*; Robert Prosser, the business manager of the Far East Bureau of *Newsweek* magazine; Walter Simmons, Far East correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*; (Mr. Simmons came to this area in 1944.) and Robert Eunson, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Japan and Korea, assigned to the Far East shortly after the war began.

Gentlemen, suppose we begin by talking a moment of the enemy. Most of the questions which our listeners have submitted deal with possible alternatives which may be under consideration, but before we discuss them, it might be well to see what we're up against. What do you think is the enemy's real objective in Korea? First, Bob Prosser of *Newsweek* magazine.

Mr. Prosser: I feel that the enemy's objective in Korea has

been the complete removal of Western and democratic forces in that country. Their desire is the complete removal of all democratic forces, so that their own communist forces may come in to fill whatever political vacuum may remain. The fact that they have not been able to do it is a setback to them. Apparently what they had hoped for was a bloodless coup, but they, in exchange, have a very bloody one, and a by-product of their effort is the speed-up of American industry at home to counteract the efforts of the communist hordes in Korea.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Bob Prosser. Now I believe Walter Simmons of the *Chicago Tribune* has a comment.

Mr. Simmons: Mr. Traum, I think that we can approach that question by asking ourselves, what is our mission in the Far East? Our mission in the Far East boils down simply to this: to deny the industrial facilities of Japan to the communist world. I think the first objective of the communists in Korea is to kick us out of Korea—as simple as that. Their next move will be to take over Japan, because that is their main objective in the Far East. Of course there is a variable thing that Mao Tze-tung is getting out of us. He is building up his armed forces. This situation allows him to get military help from Russia in the form of materiel.

Mr. Traum: All right, thank you very much, Mr. Simmons. Now let's go to Gunnar Back in ABC's New York studios for our first listener question. Our first question comes from Des Moines, Iowa, Station KSO.

Man: My name is E. A. Weber and I live at 691 West 33rd Street

in Des Moines, Iowa. What is our ultimate goal in Korea?

Mr. Traum: All right, let's call first on Mr. Lindesay Parrott of the *New York Times*.

Mr. Parrott: Well, our ultimate goal, our only goal in Korea, of course, was expressed some time ago by the United Nations, which was to unify all of Korea under a democratic form of government. That doesn't seem to be very possible right at the moment. I suppose the real objective now is to see how close we can approach the ultimate goal. We might try to drive to the Yalu River, establish a unified Korea, establish as democratic a government as possible and go on from there. Another thing we can do is decide that that isn't immediately feasible and may not be feasible for some time, stay where we are, and accept the deadlock with the hope that something will break.

On that second basis, of course, we still will have gained something. We will have accomplished the minor objective of containing communism on the Peninsula. I should say our ultimate goal in Korea, or rather our goal at the moment is to get the most that we can out of what we've got — a rather unpromising situation.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Parrott, for your observation and now let's take our second question from New York.

Mr. Back: R. A. Peterson, from 2007 West 8th Street in Duluth, Minnesota, has this question which comes to us through station WDSM: "Is there any assurance that the question of the exchange of prisoners is the only stumbling block to an honorable truce in Korea?"

Mr. Traum: I think all the mem-

bers of our panel here in Tokyo would like to comment on that particular question, but let's call first on Robert Eunson of the Associated Press.

Mr. Eunson: This question from Duluth reminds me of that old axiom that there are two schools of foreign correspondents — the Gee Whiz Boys and the Oh Yeah Boys. Well, the Oh Yeah Boys had had it up until last spring when it became obvious to quite a few of us that the Chinese Communists were ready to sign an armistice, providing they got what they wanted on the exchange of prisoner issue. That broke up the ball game. The two delegations were at opposite poles and it became quite obvious that we weren't going to get anywhere in the talks from then on.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Mr. Eunson. I believe Henry Hayward of the *Christian Science Monitor* would like to add something to that.

Mr. Hayward: Well, Mr. Traum, it seems to me that the exchange of prisoners is an issue that's been so thoroughly discussed, and on which the difference has been fairly well narrowed down to the voluntary versus involuntary thesis, that it probably isn't the *only* thing that is keeping an armistice from being agreed to. The general opinion of many people that you talk to here is that an armistice could be attained in a few hours, almost any afternoon, if Moscow or Peiping would give the word to go ahead on it.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Hayward. Do any of you gentlemen see any prospects at all for a truce in the near future?

All: No.

Mr. Traum: All agreed? No

truce. Thank you very much for your discussion of that. And now, Gunnar Back again, and another question.

Mr. Back: Our next listener question is from Station WJZ, New York City.

Lady: I am Mrs. Lillian Solon of 4732 41st Street, Long Island City, New York. I would like to ask, "What would be the effect in Asia if the Chinese Nationalist troops were introduced into the Korean conflict?"

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Mrs. Solon, and now we're going to call first on Henry Hayward of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Mr. Hayward: Well, this question from Mrs. Solon about using Chinese Nationalists in the Korean conflict recalls immediately to me something I believe that President Rhee of South Korea pointed out recently, which is that if you bring Chinese Nationalists into Korea, you are in effect extending the Chinese Civil War to the Korean Peninsula. In effect, if the Nationalists went into the line you would have Nationalist Chinese fighting Communist Chinese in Korea, and you would be repeating what went on in China.

Much as the South Koreans want help, they're not terribly anxious to have help on such terms as that, but on the other hand, there is a great desire to have more man power in Korea and they will take it from almost any place that offers it. It's just my own personal opinion, but I think that perhaps Chinese Nationalist troops, if they were sent to Korea and the political objections were overridden, might better be used behind the lines in chasing guerrillas in the South Korean hills or, per-

haps, even duty, guarding some of the non-Chinese war prisoners. In that way, they would make a contribution and they would release other troops for front line service.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Hayward. Mr. Prosser, I believe you wanted to add something to that statement.

Mr. Prosser: There would be a large hue and cry raised by the communists in case the Nationalist Chinese were to come into this conflict. It's academic they couldn't come in without U. S. help. Logistically, they have to be brought to the field of conflict. To do that, the Americans must assist them. Therefore the Russians, radio Peiping, radio Moscow, would renew their blasts against us as war-mongers. However, that too is academic. They're so mad at us now there's not a whole lot more they can do, there's not a whole lot more they can say that will do us any damage. As far as the communists' taking umbrage to the extent that they would go to war on this, they will go to war with us at their own time and at the time it is most favorable to them, not to us. So that aspect of it could almost be written off.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Bob Prosser. Walter Simmons of the *Chicago Tribune*.

Mr. Simmons: I'll go along with most of what Mr. Prosser said. I hold that we should ask ourselves, how mad can these people get at us? Since when have Americans become so timid that we have to sit and worry about what people say about us in the remote corners of the world? That doesn't sound like the Americans in the history books that I read when I was a kid in school. We must be strong and have faith in the righteousness of

our own beliefs and go ahead on them.

You won't find very many men in Korea splitting hairs over whether we should have Nationalist Chinese in the front lines; they say bring them on, we can use them. As far as chasing guerrillas behind the lines—that's a touchy political subject. The guerrilla question in Korea is very much tied up in politics and will probably be intensified if you put Chinese or Americans or anybody else chasing after Koreans.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Mr. Simmons. While we're speaking of China, we might discuss for just a moment the possibility of a blockade of the China Coast. Might that be more effective, or just as effective, as using Nationalist troops? Would any of you care to discuss the blockade possibility?

Mr. Hayward: As far as a pure and simple blockade of the Asiatic mainland is concerned, it seems very difficult to me to have one work where the British are at the moment still attempting to maintain their political ties with the Peiping regime. If we are going to try and choke China economically, it isn't very easy to do if there is a front door open through Hong Kong and other contacts. Now I realize perfectly that Britain has to develop and hold its economic position in Asia just as much as it can, but I only raise that point to show that American and British interests might conflict in that area.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Mr. Hayward. Again Walter Simmons.

Mr. Simmons: When you see American dead being brought down from those hills in Korea it makes you mad; it makes you feel

belligerent, and it makes you wonder why we can't take any step that would help us win this war in Korea and save the lives of our men. I think a blockade would be a big help to the war in Korea.

Mr. Traum: All right, sir, thank you very much. Now let's have the next question from the United States. Here is a question submitted by a Town Meeting listener at Station WJZ in New York City.

Man: My name is Maurice Maxwell and I live at 273 Buffalo Avenue in Brooklyn. This is my question: How long would it take the South Koreans to man a major portion of the front line?

Mr. Traum: Well, Mr. Lindesay Parrott of the *New York Times*, what do you think?

Mr. Parrott: The Koreans, of course, are manning a very large part of the line, across the Peninsula right now. How long it might take them to *man* the whole thing is rather difficult to say. Perhaps a year, perhaps less; it would imply doubling their forces. One of the suggestions that they made to General Eisenhower was that their armed force should be doubled. It would be purely a question of man power. It's inconceivable, of course, that Korea ever could fight China, a country of 21 million South Koreans against the huge man power of China—it's an impossible thing. Unless there were foreign aid, foreign aid on a very large scale, there would be practically nothing to prevent the communists from overrunning South Korea any time they really wanted to make a major effort.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Parrott. Bob Eunson, please.

Mr. Eunson: Well, I don't think we should let any opportunity pass, however, Lindesay, to tell

the folks back home how much improved this South Korean army is now. A month ago they fought it out tooth and toe nail with the Chinese at Sniper Ridge, and it was a 200 per cent better fighting outfit than the early divisions you and Walt Simmons recall that bugged out and ran in the early days of the war. The South Korean divisions that General Van Fleet has trained stand and fight. Of course, I agree with you, Lindsay, that they have to have our support, especially our logistic support; but as far as the man power is concerned, they've got it and they're real men.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Eunson. Mr. Parrott again.

Mr. Parrott: Yes, I quite agree with you, Bob, that there is huge improvement, but the thing that I'm afraid of is that the folks back home nourish the illusion that some time the Koreans can do it all by themselves; and no matter how they improve, there simply aren't enough of them and they simply don't have the resources to handle it alone.

Mr. Eunson: Well, I just wanted to get back to the Gee Whiz angle again and point out that that army has really improved.

Mr. Traum: And a word from Walter Simmons on this.

Mr. Simmons: Korea now is actually supplying nothing at all to the prosecution of the war except those men and part of the food that they eat. Everything else is coming from the United States.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much. I believe Mr. Prosser has undershirts too.

Mr. Prosser: At the outset of the creation of the Police Reserve in Japan, Premier Yoshida said that he could supply one thing for the

United States — he could supply men in undershirts. That's the same thing that the Koreans can supply us. We have to take them from there on out. undershirts too.

Mr. Simmons: Except for one thing, we've been supplying the

Mr. Traum: Well, gentlemen, our time is fleeting here. We could spend several more minutes, I know, discussing each one of these questions but we know there are many more questions yet to come, so let's go to Gunnar Back in New York for our next one.

Mr. Back: We've received many similar questions and in each case we've selected the one with the earlier postmark. We have a question now from Roanoke, Virginia, and it's ABC affiliate, WROV.

Lady: I am Mrs. George Steedman. Why could not Japanese soldiers trained in the last war be recruited to help out in Korea as suggested by Congressman Martin?

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mrs. Steedman, and our first comment from Henry Hayward of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Mr. Hayward: Well, Mrs. Steedman's question is one of those that looks fairly simple to answer, and therefore I'm a little leery of answering it. It may not be so simple, but on the face of it at least we know two things: one that the Japanese do not want to be assigned either to fight or to serve anywhere outside Japan. They have made that very clear during the last election, last October, and moreover their present relations with South Korea are very poor. You add to that, moreover, the fact that Koreans do not want the Japanese to come there. Just before President-elect Eisenhower visited Korea, President

Rhee held a press conference at Seoul in which he laid a great deal of emphasis on South Korea's fear of a Japanese renaissance, of a rebirth, and of their troops being sent anywhere, especially into Korea.

He gave me at least the impression that South Koreans would be as likely to fight Japanese if they came to Korea as communists. Also, bearing on that, is the fact that the Japanese people, at least a great many of them, seem sincerely and deeply opposed to rearmament; and if their troops are to be sent overseas, that means more men must replace them as a police protective force here, an increase in taxes, more men drafted and all those things, and while that isn't the whole of the question, that is the thing that the average Japanese sees first.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Mr. Hayward, and a comment from Bob Eunson of the Associated Press.

Mr. Eunson: We fought World War II to drive the Japanese out of Korea and their other holdings in the Far East. It seems incongruous now that we would want to encourage the Japanese to build up their armies again and eventually give them back Korea. I think the time will come when we'll want to see Japan have a good army and restore her balance of power in the Far East; but first we have a mission out here, and that is, while we're fighting the Chinese with one hand, we're trying to reach the Japanese with the other hand to get along with their neighbors.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, Bob Eunson. Walter Simmons?

Mr. Simmons: You must remember, too, that the Japanese have a

peculiar bitterness when it comes to the subject of Korea. When the war ended there were 600,000 Japanese in Korea. Most of them were innocent civilians who had done nothing except go over there to live and many of whom had been pushed over there by their own government.

Mr. Traum: All right, gentlemen, thank you. Now may we have our next question from home?

Mr. Back: The next question for discussion by our correspondents in Tokyo comes from Albany, New York, Station WXXW.

Lady: This is Mrs. Eugen Markley, Putnam Road, Schenectady, New York. I would like the speakers to comment on this: Since truce talks have provided no answer in Korea, wouldn't an all-out offensive for victory by the UN Army be the sort of action the communists would understand and perhaps be the best answer in Korea?

Mr. Traum: Let's hear first from Bob Prosser answering this question by Mrs. Markley of Schenectady. Bob Prosser of *Newsweek* magazine.

Mr. Prosser: Well, I think we can answer Mrs. Markley's question with just one word: yes.

Mr. Traum: Are all you in agreement with Mr. Prosser on that?

Everybody: Yes.

Mr. Traum: All right, that was a fast one. Now may we have the next question, please?

Mr. Back: Duane Kugelman from Marysville, California, has this question for our correspondents.

Mr. Kugelman: How can the war be won if we don't go into, or bomb, Manchuria?

Mr. Traum: May we hear first

from Walter Simmons of the *Chicago Tribune*?

Mr. Simmons: This is another one of those innocent sounding questions which turn out to be, as the English cricket players say, a trap for young players. How *can* we bomb Manchuria? I don't know whether you people agree with me or not, but I don't think we now have the capacity out here to bomb Manchuria. What kind of bombers do we have that can outrun the MIG 15? The Chinese have a defense set up across the Yalu River which is especially designed to prevent us from doing that. They have somewhere in the neighborhood of 2000 short-range, but very fast and very deadly airplanes up there—jets. And I don't think we have anything that could run into that class of opposition and come back.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Simmons, for your observation.

Mr. Hayward: Well, this question of how the war can be won if we don't go into bomb Manchuria is certainly the kind of question the United Nations command would like to know the answer to. However, I think we should bear in mind also that while we have not so far bombed Manchuria, at any rate that gives us some recompense, in the sense that the enemy air force does not, and indeed it is not designed to, bomb us. They have their sanctuary; we also have ours in the sense that our air fields and supply lines are not attacked behind the front, and that means a little bit to us, too, because their big supply base is just across the Yalu, whereas our supply base is really across the Pacific.

Mr. Traum: While we're speaking of bombing Manchuria, would you care to discuss for a moment the use of the atom bomb either in

Korea or possibly in Manchuria, itself?

Mr. Hayward: Well, I fear to rush in on this atom bomb business, because I'm no expert on it. I am certain that in Manchuria there are concentrated targets that atom bomb people would say would provide us with results, but the atom bomb or the hydrogen bomb, or any other weapon of that sort that we have, is something that needs to be estimated and evaluated as to target only by experts. I don't think that you can ask a GI or even a newspaperman to tell you whether an atom bomb is feasible here or there. I think the experts ought to tell us.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Hayward. Now may we have the next one from home?

Mr. Back: Here is a question submitted by a Town Meeting listener at Station KFRU at Columbia, Missouri.

Man: My name is Thomas A. Howard, 704 Maryland St., Columbia, Missouri. If the Korean conflict continues and truce talks remain stalemated, do you feel that the nations of the UN should gradually pull out?

Mr. Traum: For our discussion by this panel of war correspondents here in Tokyo, let's begin with Bob Eunson of the Associated Press.

Mr. Eunson: Well, right now, I don't think that the United Nations forces should start any withdrawal from Korea. If we pull out of Korea, we might as well pull clear out of the Far East and move all the way back to Pearl Harbor. And you know where we were then. Eventually, perhaps, the South Koreans will be strong enough to hold off the North Koreans and the Chinese, but for now I'd say,

no. I think we wouldn't only lose face in Asia, but we'd lose a good foothold in the Far East that we may need some day, and not too far off, either.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Eunson. Bob Prosser of *Newsweek*?

Mr. Prosser: Well, we have an example to go by in the case of pulling out, Bob, and that is we pulled out once in 1949. We had to fight our way back in when the war started in Korea. The Japanese were coming to the Americans, the few that were here, saying, "Where are the Americans? We have been chasing the Koreans around for several generations. Why is it that the Koreans are chasing the Americans around?" The only answer was, "the Americans aren't here yet. Wait till they get here." We got here, we took a long bloody course up to the Yalu River. We came part way back; now we're stalemated there.

If we pull out a second time we're just asking for a third landing some place else, because the right that the North Koreans and the Russians are waging at present is not a short-term affair; it's a long-term affair whether it's fought in wars or at peace tables. We're at war 24 hours a day.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Prosser, and here is Henry Hayward of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Mr. Hayward: Well, I think most of the men here will agree that while it is very difficult to pull out now or later, it certainly would be desirable, if we *could* without a loss of face, to reduce our commitment in Korea in the sense that American and other United Nations military officials wish they had the divisions that are so thoroughly committed in Korea for us to stop holes that may develop

elsewhere around the periphery of communism. There's also that point that in Korea, with to some extent our first line troops there, we are using, as the old saying goes, our first team against their second team, and militarily, that's something that we would not like to have go on forever. But it isn't easy, of course, to pull out and just leave the situation as it is.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Hayward. Mr. Howard of Columbia, Missouri, is hearing from all our correspondents on this one. Here is Walter Simmons.

Mr. Simmons: A strictly military viewpoint on that question of Mr. Howard's runs like this: it actually takes more men to maintain a defense line, which is what we're doing there, than it does to go on the offensive. Your offensive is like the point of a spear, but you've got to have somebody in the line all along the line if you're on the defensive. So, actually, military men would agree with Mr. Eunson on this.

Mr. Eunson: Thank you, Walter.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much, gentlemen. Now, Gunnar Back, will you bring in another question, please?

Mr. Back: Our next listener question is from Walter S. Adams of Lasell Junior College in Auburndale, Massachusetts. It comes to us through Station WLAW at Boston.

Mr. Adams: Is the answer in Korea an ultimatum to Russia?

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Adams, for your question. Let's call first on Lindesay Parrott of the *New York Times*.

Mr. Parrott: What do we say to Russia? Bring about a truce in Korea or else what? What's the

threat back of it? I suppose the classic threat is the atom bomb, a threat that they now have too. I, myself, don't think it would have any effect at all. I'm inclined to think that Mr. Vishinsky would stay awake all night laughing again.

Mr. Traum: What about the United Nations taking action within the Assembly against Russia? Could Russia be expelled from the UN?

Mr. Parrott: Well, I don't believe Russia would really care very much. I don't think that would inflict any penalty sufficient to make Russia change her world policy.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Parrott. I see Bob Eunson would like to add a word.

Mr. Eunson: Well, I think that expelling Russia from the UN would just be the beginning of the end, that's all. As long as we're talking we aren't fighting, don't you think, Lindesay?

Mr. Parrott: I think we're doing both, myself. Quite clearly Russia equipped the Chinese and the Koreans.

Mr. Eunson: Anyway we aren't in an all-out war with Russia yet.

Mr. Parrott: Not yet.

Mr. Traum: Mr. Hayward?

Mr. Hayward: Well, if we are either going to expel Russia from UN or put it on trial; in either case we, in a sense, get rid of Russia at UN. We just change the United Nations into a Western Power alliance, which isn't the objective. The objective is to have Russia there, to give her a place to air her views, and a place, perhaps, in some tremendous time in the future to concede something or to give something. That's highly unlikely, as you know, but as far

as issuing ultimatums to Russia is concerned, which was Mr. Adams' original question, I think we ought to be very careful that we issue ultimatums to no one unless we are prepared to back them up. If you issue an ultimatum to the chief communist nation, the back-up might lead you into World War III. Whether or not that's desirable, we have to face it, and to face it before we issue the ultimatum.

Mr. Simmons: Most Americans in the Far East would go along with that, Hank. What we've been doing in our foreign policy has been talking; the thumb-twiddling, striped-pants crowd has been sitting around talking. Americans are accustomed to action. Let's not give Russia any ultimatums; let's kick Russia out of the United Nations. Okay, that's action; that isn't talking. That's the way many Americans have got to believe in the Far East.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Simmons. I believe Mr. Parrott has a word.

Mr. Parrott: How much pressure do you think it would bring on Russia to kick her out of the United Nations, Walter? It would be action, I agree, but would it be action of any effect at all?

Mr. Simmons: Well, that would be just like kicking a guest out of your house that misbehaves himself at the table. I say kick him out.

Mr. Hayward: Instead of talking about kicking Russia out of the UN, I think we should concentrate on kicking the communists out of Korea.

Mr. Traum: All right. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Now we're ready for another question from the United States.

Mr. Back: The next question for

discussion comes from Kelly J. Cook, who lives on a Star Route in Bellepoint, West Virginia.

Mr. Cook: What immediate effect, if any, did President-elect Eisenhower's visit to Korea have on the course of the war?

Mr. Traum: To answer Mr. Cook's question, we'll call first on Mr. Hayward.

Mr. Hayward: Well, the one thing that we know about Eisenhower's visit is that he saw a great deal and that he heard a great deal. He plainly has no immediate panacea as he put it, no trick solution, but he did assemble and accumulate and absorb a great deal of information. And on the basis of that information he might, indeed we all hope he will, conceive a new approach. It may not be disclosed right away, and it certainly will not be put into action until Eisenhower takes office; but at least one effect, that was somewhat measurable, is the gladness with which the Korean troops welcomed Eisenhower's visit.

And as I understand it, Syngman Rhee and Dwight Eisenhower met three times and parted on friendly terms, and I think that's quite an accomplishment too. Three times meeting with Syngman Rhee and parting on friendly terms is quite a record, isn't it, Hank? I think one point has been overlooked. Eisenhower had a great effect on the course of the war, even before he came out here.

His introduction of the war into the campaign as an issue led to some remarkably fast action that we didn't appreciate until the election was over and that was in the equipping of these two new Korean divisions. We found out here in Japan after the election that orders came from Washing-

ton to equip those divisions pronto, and the ordnance boys down south of Yokohama worked day and night; ships were rushed from all over, to get that equipment over there, and do it fast, but no announcement was made of that at the time.

Mr. Traum: Thank you very much. Now, gentlemen, I believe we have time for just another question here which I would like to ask you. Has the Korean War been worth while in any respect?

Mr. Prosser: Well, it's absolutely essential. I believe firmly that it's been worth while. There are too many people in the international cemetery at Pusan to believe it hasn't been worth while. For one thing, it has shown the small nations of the Orient and of Asia that the United States will stand up, that the free nations of the world can stand up and draw a line across which the aggressor cannot step. Other than that, and the possible by-product is that it has awakened the people in the states, I hope, to the fact that there is a war going on—there is a shooting war, a very intense, hot shooting war going on, and it's best you get ready for it.

Mr. Traum: Thank you, Mr. Prosser, and here is the *New York Times'* Lindesay Parrott.

Mr. Parrott: Perhaps the easiest way to approach that question is to consider what situation we would be in now if the Korean War had not been fought. No doubt South Korea would have been taken, and in a matter of six weeks. The communists by now would have had two years or more to build up bases there. It's a very crucial question, indeed, whether with military and air bases in Korea Japan could be held at all. Somebody suggested that if

we didn't hold Korea we might as well go back to our Pearl Harbor perimeter. I can see that we might be back there already if the Korean War had not been fought.

Mr. Traum: I'm sorry, gentlemen, that we haven't more time, but we've reached our deadline tonight. On behalf of Town Hall and our listeners, may I thank you, Robert Eunson of the Associated Press, Walter Simmons of the *Chicago Tribune*, Robert Prosser of *Newsweek* magazine, Henry Hay-

ward of the *Christian Science Monitor* and Lindesay Parrott of the *New York Times*? Friends, it has been our purpose in coming to Tokyo for this Town Meeting to bring to you, listening at home, the first-hand knowledge of these war correspondents, answering and discussing the questions which you have submitted to us during the past few weeks. Good night, from Tokyo. So plan to be with us next week and every week at the sound of the Crier's Bell.



THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

(Continued from page 2)

has spent the last eight years in various parts of the Pacific as a correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*. Since 1945 he has been the *Tribune* representative in Tokyo and since June, 1950, working from his Tokyo base, he has covered the Korean war. He was in Seoul when the war started and filed the first eye witness reports for the *Tribune* and the Mutual Broadcasting System.

ROBERT M. PROSSER—Business Manager of the Pacific edition of *Newsweek* magazine. Mr. Prosser began his newspaper career on the Omaha, Nebraska, *World-Herald*, got experience on the news side as picture editor and on the business side handling circulation and advertising promotion. During World War II Mr. Prosser served with the Marine Corps as a combat correspondent and an editor of *Leatherneck*. After V-J Day he returned to the *World-Herald* as picture editor, later became a member of General MacArthur's public relations staff in Japan. Mr. Prosser joined *Newsweek* in 1950 where he has worked exclusively with the Far East edition.

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The following Town Meeting Bulletins on various aspects of our Asian policy, especially with regard to the Korean War, provide a record of opinion among both Asian and American authorities in recent years. Copies may be ordered from Town Hall, New York 36, New York. Bulletins in Volume 16 are 10c each; those in Volumes 17 and 18 are 15c each.

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